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aquifer, and the Ranch was not entitled to use the relaxed standards set
forth in the statute for determining tributariness. Minus these particular
standards, the groundwater underlying the South Park property was
tributary and was be subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation.
However, the supreme court also stated that it did not agree with the
water court's ruling that because the groundwater was tributary, the Ranch
must replace 100% of its out-of-priority withdrawals. The court held that
"water is available for appropriation if the taking thereof does not cause
injury and that where senior users can show no injury by the diversion of
water, they cannot preclude beneficial use of water by another." Thus, if
the Ranch made an out-of-priority diversion, it was required to avoid
material injury to senior surface rights, but was not required to replace
100% of such diversions.
Stephanie Pickens

CONNECTICUT
Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, 740 A.2d 847
(Conn. 1999) (holding that the commission could not accept monetary
payment and in-kind services as mitigation for wetland destruction).
Based upon Stop & Shop's ("S & S") desire to construct a
supermarket, S & S applied to the Inland Wetlands Commission
("Commission") for a permit to conduct regulated activities on property
located within the town of Branford. Three wetlands and one watercourse
existed on the property. S & S's initial plan proposed to eliminate two
wetlands and create a new wetland adjacent to the third existing wetland.
The commission found that "significant activity," as defined in the
Branford inland wetlands and watercourse regulations, would occur on land
regulated as "wetlands" or "watercourses" in accordance with state
statutes.
Consequently, the Commission scheduled public hearings
pertaining to S & S's application.
Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C.
("Branhaven"), intervened in the matter.
During the proceedings, S & S altered its proposal by suggesting a
detention or infiltration basin construction on the property, instead of
creating a new wetland. The Commission expressed skepticism about S &
S's new proposal's effect on the watershed. S & S amended its proposal
by offering monetary payment and in-kind services for future off-site
mitigation. The Commission accepted that proposal and integrated it into
the approval of the permit.
On March 13, 1997, the Commission condoned S & S's application
subject to nine conditions. Condition six declared that S & S give the
Commission money for future mitigation, restoration, improvement, and/or
study in the same watershed. Furthermore, condition six stipulated that the
banking mitigation amount was to be no less than $25,000 plus a like

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 3

amount of in-kind professional/engineering services to be provided for the
above-mentioned purposes during the next four to five years. Finally,
condition six dictated that the Commission's funding and gift of services
usage was discretionary.
Branhaven appealed the Commission's decision to the trial court. S &
S filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. After the trial
court heard argument on the merits, the court decided to dismiss the
appeal; thus it upheld the Commission's decision approving S & S's
application. Branhaven appealed to the lower court, which granted the
appeal. S & S filed a motion to dismiss asserting that Branhaven lacked
standing to intervene. The appellate court denied S & S's motion. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut rendered a stay of execution.
The issue before the court was whether the trial court improperly
determined that the Commission could accept monetary payment and inkind services as mitigation. The court determined that it had plenary
review due to the fact that no special deference was bestowed to an agency
decision when a question of law, not previously subject to judicial scrutiny,
existed.
The court analyzed the legislative intent to ascertain a statutory
interpretation. A state statute averred that the purpose of the act was to
further the preservation and protection of the wetlands and watercourses
from random, unnecessary, undesirable, and unregulated uses. The court
asserted that the legislature limited the municipality's scope of conduct,
because the state statutes pronounced factors the commissioner must
consider in accomplishing these purposes and policies, including matters
relating to regulation, licensing, and provisional enforcement. The factors
included: (1) the proposal's environmental impact on the wetlands or
watercourses; (2) the applicant's purpose and any alternatives; (3) the
relationship between the proposal's short-term and long-term impacts on
wetlands or watercourses; (4) the irreversible and irretrievable loss of
wetland or watercourse resources, including the extent to which such
activity would foreclose a future ability to protect, enhance or restore such
resources, and any mitigation measures; (5) the character and degree of
injury to or interference with safety, health, or the reasonable property use;
and (6) the proposed regulated activity's impacts on wetlands or
watercourses outside the area and on future activities.
Appropriate
mitigation requirements might include measures to: (1) prevent or
minimize other environmental damage; (2) maintain or enhance existing
environmental quality; or (3) in the following order of priority: restore,
enhance, and create productive wetland or watercourse resources. The
court relied on the delineated hierarchy of considerations for mitigation
reviewal incorporated within the state statute and concluded that the
wetland creation was preferentially lower than all other mitigating
measures.
The court observed that precedent was factually distinguishable from
the present case. In the earlier case, the court held that nothing in the
statute prohibited the Commission from agreeing with the applicants that
the applicants would provide off-site compensation for the wetlands loss, as
long as the Commission had contemplated the impact on the property.
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There, the applicants were responsible for actual mitigation and were
required to excavate an off-site pond, not merely pay money. In the
present case, S & S had dislodged itself from all responsibility by giving
monetary payment and in-kind professional services. The court concluded
that S & S's proposal negated the legislative intent to protect and preserve
the state's wetlands and watercourses, because the monetary payment and
in-kind service proposal removed S & S from all mitigation
responsibilities. Thus, the court held that the lower court incorrectly
decided that the Commission could properly accept monetary payment and
in-kind services in lieu of mitigation.
The court pondered whether the Commission's monetary payment and
in-kind services acceptance was an integral part of the Commission's
decision to grant the permit. The court pointed out that the Commission
approved S & S's proposal only after S & S offered mitigation of monetary
payment and in-kind services. Therefore, the court concluded that the
mitigation was integral to the Commission's decision-making and
invalidated the commission's decision.
Sara Franklin
Wood v. Somers Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No. CV970063972S, 1999 WL
1013118 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1999) (dismissing plaintiffs claim
that the collection, storage, and transportation of spring water were within
the local zoning regulation's definition of agriculture and/or farming).
A Town of Somers zoning enforcement officer issued a cease and
desist order to the plaintiffs, Bruce Wood ("Wood") and David Gavlak
("Gavlak"), in 1996.
A natural free-flowing spring flowed through
Wood's farm. Gavlak, owner of Hillside Spring Water, Inc., leased a part
of Wood's farm to collect, store, and transport the spring water from the
farm for commercial human consumption. The cease and desist order
stated that Wood's and Galvak's activities pertaining to the spring were not
agricultural and/or farming in nature, and thus not permitted by local
zoning regulations.
Wood and Gavlak (collectively "Bottlers") contested the zoning
officer's order before the Somers Zoning Board of Appeals. The Bottlers
argued that their use of the spring was "harvesting" of spring water, and
was thus permitted within the zoning regulation's definition of agriculture
and/or farming. Alternatively, the Bottlers claimed that their use fit the
non-conforming use exception to the zoning regulations because water had
been extracted from the spring for the last 200 years. The Somers Zoning
Board, after a public hearing on the issue, ruled against the Bottlers on
both points. Therefore, the Bottlers brought this claim to the Superior
Court of Connecticut.
The court found no merit for the Bottlers' assertion that the present
use of the spring was a non-conforming use. The court found the Bottlers
could not carry their burden to produce evidence that the use existed at the

